Robert Short
INTERVIEW WITH THE INTERNET JOURNAL Telepolis
The following interview, organized by Peter Jellen was to receive from Telepolis 17th in two parts and 18 Published in July 2010.
Mr. Short, in the last three years, the economic crisis produced three transformation stages: from the housing crisis on the financial crisis in the financial crisis to the economic crisis and the economic crisis to currency crisis. To what extent, these three phases to explain the worsening crisis with its concept of the general crisis of capitalism?
Those three transformation stages are only the surface of phenomena from. The housing crisis was the catalyst for a long-simmering debt and financial crisis. This is rooted not in so-called speculative excesses against a per se "healthy" normal economy, but the reverse: the debt and financial bubbles were a result of lack of real recovery of capital. Has always been the credit superstructure no external factor, but an integral part of capitalist commodity production and this is folded. In the last two decades, this inner relationship to a structural dependence of the so-called real economy has increased from the financial markets. Therefore had to lead the financial crisis to a historic economic slump.
Alle Momente jener drei Stadien waren schon in der dichten Abfolge von Krisen seit der ersten Zahlungsunfähigkeit Mexikos 1982 enthalten. Zunächst schien es sich nur um eine Schuldenkrise der Peripherie zu handeln, die aber schon bald die kapitalistischen Zentren erreichte. Anfang der 1990er Jahre platzte die japanische Immobilienblase und der Nikkei-Index schrumpfte auf ein Viertel seines Höchststandes. Von der daraus folgenden Bankenkrise und binnenkonjunkturellen Stagnation hat sich Japan bis heute nicht erholt. Mitte der 1990er Jahre brach die Verschuldung der asiatischen Tigerstaaten in Fremdwährung (Dollar) zusammen und führte zu einer Währungskrise mit einer scharfen Rezession. Ähnliche Erscheinungen waren bei den Finanzkrisen Russia at the end of the Yeltsin era and from Argentina to watch the turn of the century. 2001 the world was bursting of the dotcom bubble and the "new markets" for their astronomical market capitalization of Internet sweatshops disappeared from the scene, leading to a short global recession by itself. All of these crises had in common: they were limited world regions or sectors and therefore seemed manageable, especially by low or zero interest rate policy of central banks, for which Japan had provided the pattern. This flood of money by central banks, particularly the U.S. Fed, has produced not only the biggest housing bubble of all time, but it also fostered an unexpected deficit economy, The deficit is mainly in the Pacific circulation between the U.S. and China put down and could take several years for the world economy. Still in the early summer of 2008 was the boom of the economic institutes projected for decades to come, despite all the "imbalances" of the Pacific Export-way street were aware. But the problem was played down and not taken seriously in view of the apparent facticity of a "finance-driven growth".
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008 brought to light that the globalized financial bubble economy was completely maxed out in reality. The global chain reaction which caused not only captured all the centers simultaneously, but the last corner of the world system from Iceland to Kazakhstan. The global deficit economy was out of gas. This decline was manageable with an additional flood of money is no longer the central banks. Throughout the state had to step in credit in a dimension that even surpassed the previous war economies. The rescue package for the banking system have restored the balance sheets, but only held temporarily afloat. Additional government stimulus packages in the same order of magnitude could crash while the total catch, but the problem was shifted only by financial bubbles on government finances.
The consequences made their first on the threat of national bankruptcy Griechenlands und einer damit verbundenen Krise der europäischen Währungsunion geltend. Griechenland bildet das schwächste Kettenglied in der Euro-Zone und diese das schwächste Kettenglied im Weltwährungssystem, weil der Euro auf völlig disparate nationale Produktivitätsniveaus mit unterschiedlicher Kapitalstärke als Kunstwährung aufgesetzt wurde und nur tauglich für die einseitigen Exportströme der Defizitkonjunktur war. Diese Währungskrise hat aber eine andere Qualität als die früheren; sie ist der Vorbote für eine allgemeine Krise der Staatsfinanzen, die nicht nur die zentralen EU-Staaten wie die BRD, Frankreich und Großbritannien erfassen wird, sondern auch die USA und China.
Gegenwärtig you want to be comforted by the fact that the rescue packages, the "confidence" in the ailing financial system restore and revert the mountains of bad loans back into tradable securities, would give off the immense economic programs of the "starter" for a new self-supporting global economy should. This Entwarnungsdiskurs that clings to the surface of appearances and lurches from quarter to quarter, but the bill without the host of the underlying capitalist Systemgesetzlichkeit made. The running since 2008 crisis process is not only the culmination of the partial global crises in the past three decades, but it also differs from all previous cyclical or structural crises. Ready to become
is a secular inner self-contradiction of capital utilization, which can be represented in two stages. First, forced by the competition development of productive forces has meant that the share of physical capital (machines, etc.) was always larger in the course of turning production over the share of labor force. In order to use only one capital-productive work force, had an ever-growing property unit to be mobilized (rising capital intensity). Thus grew the dead-front costs for capital exploitation to an extent that it is always less of the current earnings could be funded (machine used to transmit only produced no value and create new value). The result was a historic expansion of the credit system at all levels (enterprise, government, private households). To produce current value can had in ever increasing proportions of future value in the form of the loan to anticipate. This contradiction was bearable as long as the loans could be operated by operating real value added production. went out with the third industrial revolution of microelectronics since the late 1970s, however, this compensation mechanism, the real value-producing labor force has been gradually rationalized in a new historical dimension. Damit drohten die immer weiter in die Zukunft vorgreifenden Kreditketten zu reißen und rissen auch tatsächlich an immer mehr Stellen. Es ist kein Zufall, dass der Einsatz der dritten industriellen Revolution mit dem Beginn jener Serie von Finanz-, Wirtschafts- und Währungskrisen zusammenfällt, die heute ihre Kulmination erleben.
Die sogenannte neoliberale Revolution war kein subjektives politisches Projekt, sondern eine Flucht nach vorn angesichts des objektiven Problems mangelnder realer Mehrwertproduktion. Was jetzt blauäugig als historischer Fehler ausgegeben wird, nämlich die umfassende Deregulierung der Finanzmärkte, war in Wirklichkeit die einzig mögliche Art und Weise, den Kollaps des Weltsystems hinauszuschieben. The capital recovery virtualized in the form of a no longer be retracted between the real substance of value "fictitious capital", the debt-economy mutated to a financial bubble economy (stocks and real estate) with increasingly challenging derivatives. That link has developed over two decades to an unprecedented deficit in the history of real capitalist economy. The deficit economy is to be called so because the apparent recovery is not, as in previous short-term bubble formation in the financial skies remained, but as insubstantial purchasing power for consumption by the middle classes (with falling real wages) as well as to invest in themselves by capitalist criteria unreal becoming real economy was fed and fueled the global economy. The millions of seemingly real jobs in the one-sided export-oriented industries are an optical illusion, because the sale of their products are not based on real profits and wages, but on the injection from the superstructure of credit have become lazy and out of the financial bubbles.
Already the flood of money the central banks that the fracture occurred with the monetarist doctrine of neoliberalism (limiting the money supply), was a desperate emergency measure. The recent shift the problem resolves the state credit, the problem certainly not, but it only postpones until expectable recent burglary. Nowhere sind neue reale Verwertungspotentiale in Sicht, für die staatliche Konjunkturprogramme einen „Anschub“ bilden könnten. So erweist sich der innere Zusammenhang von Finanz-, Wirtschafts- und Währungskrise als historische innere Schranke des Kapitals auf der Höhe der von ihm selbst erzeugten Produktivkraftentwicklung und Verwissenschaftlichung der Reproduktion. Der erreichte Grad der negativen (auf Wert und Konkurrenz beruhenden) Vergesellschaftung lässt sich nicht mehr in die kapitalistischen Kategorien einbannen.
Wie hoch sind nun ihrer Schätzung nach die Gefahren einer Inflation oder Deflation?
Inflation und Deflation sind nur zwei verschiedene Formen der Entwertung von Aggregatzuständen des Kapitals. Structural mass unemployment, insecurity and low wages on a global scale as a result of the third industrial revolution brought already a deflationary devaluation of labor power, ie, the after Marx "variable" (only new value-producing) instruments. The flip side was the financial bubble economy, the development of unsubstantiated and therefore fictitious claims and balances as an asset inflation (asset inflation). Because the global chain these asset inflation lasted for many currency areas, it could keep longer without a major devaluation of the money medium even turn over. But this was the final stage of the last deficit economy to predict than inflation in many emerging countries, including China, 20 percent were headed and was expected in the U.S. in late 2008, a rate of 6 to 10 percent. Basically, would have led the creation of substance-free purchasing power of the financial bubbles in spite of their complex global exchange paths ultimately lead to the same result as the classical infationären cranking the printing presses.
This scenario is completed, however, when the crash burnt the financial markets on a blow trillions of dollars and euros of fictitious assets or in terms of actually worthless, but through state guarantees collateralized toxic paper in the bank vault left behind that have been outsourced accounting purposes. The asset inflation suggested therefore not in a monetary inflation, but in an asset deflation. Once in this way, the previous mechanism of the deficit economy had come abruptly to a halt, had an equally rapid reduction of global excess capacity in production have to follow (especially the automobile industry), which had built only because of the influx of fictitious purchasing power out of debt and financial bubbles can be, so a pervasive devaluation of fixed capital in the factories (production resources) and capital goods on the market (becoming unsaleable goods), associated with a further boost to the devaluation of labor (collective redundancies). To date, it is running a global wave of bankruptcies, But the deflation of property and capital goods could be slowed temporarily by the giant state-funded loan programs. Both in the financial sector and the manufacturing sector was thus prevented from the much loved market laws, the famous "market adjustment", because it would lack real exploitation of new potentials for these "improvements" only remain an economic wilderness.
The demolition of the excess capacity is so but only postponed, it is executed in the near future by the crisis of state finances. All economic programs and benefits are ultimately unproductive government consumption, even though it ostensibly companies by artificial Ventilation be kept alive. The State would take the credit for this consumption from the levy (tax) of operating profits and wages in real value added production. Here is the cat biting its tail, because the whole maneuver is only necessary because the latter does not take place sufficiently. Last resort in such a hopeless situation is just cranking the printing presses, as we know it from the war economy, but now as the purpose of artificial life extension of the capitalist mode of production such.
The central banks have already cut a number of safety valves, by their own rules against some toxic assets from banks as "collateral" accept or buy potentially worthless bonds of candidates for national bankruptcy (ECB). On the one hand, are so set the stage for the development of huge potential inflation, that is, the devaluation of capitalist self-purpose medium of money, from which all states of aggregation of capital and in which they must be converted back. As the flood of money the government bailouts and stimulus packages (in contrast to the flood of money by central banks for transnational financial markets) is directly fed into the respective currency areas, the incubation time for the realization of the inflationary potential is much shorter than in the case of transnational financial bubble economy. Andererseits schreckt man eben deswegen davor zurück, die Notenpresse weiter anzuheizen. Die aktuelle relative Stabilisierung auf niedrigerem Niveau als in Zeiten der boomenden Defizitkonjunktur wird aber allein von den Staatsprogrammen getragen; angesichts der realen Verwertungslage müsste der Staat dauerhaft die Konjunktur subventionieren, und das ginge nur über die Notenpresse. Deshalb konterkarieren die Sparprogramme die Rettungsmaßnahmen.
Dieses Dilemma wird seine Verlaufsform nehmen. Das Hü und Hott von sich wechselseitig ausschließenden Maßnahmen kann nicht dazu führen, dass sich Deflation und Inflation einfach aufheben und in Wohlgefallen auflösen. Da es sich bei Inflation (in Bezug auf Geld als solches) und Deflation (in terms of manpower, money, wealth, physical capital and capital goods) is only different forms of validation of elements of capitalist reproduction, in principle they can occur simultaneously. This is all the more be the case if the monetary and economic policy driven by the need and forth between conflicting options and oscillates. gave early as the late 1970s and early 1980s it was the first result of the lack of substantive recovery a simultaneity of deflationary stagnation and rising inflation (stagflation). That was precisely the reason for the neo-liberal revolution was, but those caused by deregulated financial bubble economy both a historical delay. Now around the former problem back to a much higher scale of internal contradictions. Possible, therefore, is both an inflationary or deflationary shock, if one of the options will be completely contradictory, and a period of stagflation, with much more violent swings than they were 30 years ago, when both options come off with mutually exclusive actions in rapid succession.
critics accuse of neo-liberalism in the Greek financial crisis the German politicians to represent the relationships wrong to strangle the economy of the IMF, the concept of the welfare state and to pursue at all absurd solutions. Können Sie diesen Kritikern beipflichten oder geht Ihrer Meinung nach diese Beurteilung am Kern des Phänomens vorbei?
Eine bloße Kritik des Neoliberalismus (wie bei Attac und großen Teilen der Linken) ist verkürzt, weil sie gar nicht zu den inneren Zusammenhängen der Krise vordringt, sondern lediglich eine falsche Wirtschaftspolitik sehen möchte. Verbunden damit ist die Hoffnung auf eine keynesianische Kehrtwende, die zurück zu einem „guten“ Kapitalismus mit Arbeitsplatz-Investitionen und wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Gratifikationen führen soll. Das ist Traumtänzerei, die in der Tat am Kern des Problems vorbeigeht, weil sowohl die neoliberale als auch die keynesianische Doktrin die kapitalistische Production, their categories and criteria that require both blind. The qualitatively new conditions of crisis but the prevailing mode of production itself is the problem. Keynesianism returns only as crisis and emergency management, that is a continuation of neoliberalism by other means. This can only exacerbate the internal contradictions.
's true, though, that not only the German politicians misrepresent the relationships and pursue absurd solutions, but the vain hope of a re-regulated Keynesian welfare state itself is an absurd approach. For what is the absurdity? Besides the large Pacific there was also a smaller European deficit cycle for the Euro was actually designed, namely in the German interest. The huge German export surpluses went and go to more than 40 percent in the EU and in particular in the euro area. These surpluses are the trade and current account deficits of the other EU countries, particularly the southern European compared. They were niederkonkurriert using the euro, there was no compensation by the devaluation of national currencies. After all, the relatively weak economic resuscitation of the deficit by shifting the problem from the financial bubble economy is worn on the state credit, will now form the government deficits the neighboring European countries, the flip side of a large part of the German export boom.
German elites do not admit this relationship and do not disclose the alleged export advantage. In addition to the monetary union is the fact that the FRG does not just since Hartz IV, the largest low-wage sector in Europe and real wages in this country with the assistance of the unions still holding down more than elsewhere. The steadily rising export surplus on this basis resulted in a relative financial strength of the FRG. But now the business principles of this model are called into question. Within the EU, implies a conflict between the deficit countries and the FRG on. Even in the larger scale of the transatlantic relations, the economic policy fronts have reversed. The United States is demanding as the largest deficit country, as well as the southern Europeans, that the FRG gives up any savings policy and boost domestic consumption to reduce the imbalances. Topsy-turvy world: the former leader of neo-liberalism are now demanding a diametrically opposed economic policy and take a part that the German trade unions were confident not. This seems to meet the Keynesian hopes, but so far no sense, just as it would force the inflationary option. How ogle the Board of the IMF, the U.S. and parts of the EU, with an allegedly "Controlled inflation" to handle the dilemma, but given the economic situation would quickly lose control.
The inner contradiction of the European Monetary Union has already pointed the way, as a recent massive bailout was necessary for the Greek public finances, more could follow (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland and Eastern Europe). This was no noble assistance to Greece, but an assistance operation especially for German and French banks, are sitting on hundreds of billions of Greek government bonds, the devaluation again provoke a meltdown of the financial system would. This preliminary assessment has the same character as the emergency rescue packages after the bursting of financial bubbles, now on the level of the public finances. The measure applies only to the problem of already verknusperten government bonds. To avoid the inflationary option, the FRG now throws in the pose of the Swabian house father, the Greeks and other dubious deficit sinners read the riot act and wants to force them to break-neck-saving programs. But these are really carried out, this would have to also break the German export miracle once the neck. This is the other side of the absurdity. The German export chauvinism is on shaky grounds that it is on the deficits the other is based.
this dilemma is not to escape. Secretly, the elites of course aware of. The threadbare justified resignations of senior political officials, last of the German President Koehler, an indication that behind the scenes of the official's optimism the going gets pretty tough. This could be repeated in other countries. A classic sitting out the problems along the lines of Helmut Kohl is no longer possible. Therefore, chasing the opposing repair, the need still have the demoscopic electorate in the eye, as long as it is not emergency dictatorship, and species into a general brawl aus. Die kapitalistische Produktionsweise kann nicht in Frage gestellt werden, und so ist man wie schon in der ersten Phase der Finanzkrise auf der Suche nach Schuldigen. Das Hauen und Stechen in der schwarzgelben Regierung ist nicht parteispezifisch, sondern würde sich angesichts der Problemlage in jeder beliebigen Koalition wiederholen. Kein Wunder, dass einige Kombattanten das Handtuch werfen.
Können Sie eine Einschätzung abgeben, wie es die nächste Zeit weitergehen wird?
Da die geld- und wirtschaftspolitischen Maßnahmen in sich widersprüchlich sind, ist mit einer zweiten Welle der globalen Wirtschaftskrise innerhalb der nächsten Jahre zu rechnen. Diese könnte ihren Ausgangspunkt in der Zerreißprobe European Monetary Union are. In form it is in cases such as Greece, a similar scenario, as Argentina has undergone over a decade ago. But this crisis was just limited to a single country in the world economy is negligible. It is quite different with the threat of national bankruptcy within the euro zone, as they may tear down the entire monetary union in the abyss. A collapse of the European deficit cycle rested with German export economy the core, and so would the current capital strength of Germany lost. This would mean not only that the previously deferred major bankruptcies and mass layoffs were also realize in this country. Rather then yes also, the heavily indebted German state finances came to a similar situation as now, the Greek, if it cedes to the collapse of the unilateral exports, the credit rating in financial markets. Such a development would not only be a disaster for the whole of Europe, but given the weight of Europe in the global economy for the global economy.
is no better but with the great Pacific circulation deficit between China and the U.S.. There, it is hoped both sides that the other creates the conditions for further stabilization. The government economic programs and benefits in the U.S. Although the slump in consumption partially offset without the pre-crisis levels could be reached again, but at the price that the foreign-financed public sector lending is reaching its limits and is set to finance the military machine and the war operations in perspective as the guarantor of world power position in question . The United States called on China to a long overdue appreciation of the currency of the surplus land and to build as compared to West Germany a credit-financed Strengthening domestic consumption to the imbalance of trade flows and to strengthen its own exports, which should offset the sluggish domestic consumption. In most industrial sectors, the United States but did not have the export capacity, cause their structure high investment costs. Moreover, it would have the appropriate capacity in China will be reduced, because there are American companies because of the cost advantage as well as European and Japanese companies invested heavily to supply the domestic market and foreign markets.
But China itself would like to give up its export advantage based on cheap labor and an artificially undervalued currency just as the FRG their own, because here and there, the whole economy is geared towards unilateral export. A switch that would for years if not decades, would be created, however, come quickly reached because the imbalances and their fragile Credit financing is precisely the lifeblood of the global economy were. Although China has from the fund launched its huge foreign exchange reserves, the largest government economic program of all countries and times, and forced its banks in a massive credit. That is why it can not allow any serious monetary compensation, because that would devalue its accumulated massive foreign exchange reserves. The Chinese economic programs to strengthen domestic consumption only indirectly and not to the extent necessary to pull the world economy alone can as far outside the US-financed consumption. Most of the programs flowing in additional infrastructure and production capacity, all focused on sind, dass die einseitige Exportmaschine bald wieder anspringt. Ist das nicht der Fall, dann sitzt China auf gewaltigen Investitionsruinen mit entsprechenden Konsequenzen für das Finanzsystem. Überdies kann China nicht ein solches Programm durchhalten und gleichzeitig im bisherigen Ausmaß US-Staatsanleihen kaufen.
Im pazifischen Raum wiederholt sich also im größeren Maßstab das europäische Dilemma. Beide Defizitkreisläufe gehen gegenwärtig nach dem Einbruch nur gebremst weiter und werden von den mühsam gepäppelten Binnenkonjunkturen auf Basis der Staatsprogramme flankiert. Laufen letztere aus, drohen sie zu kollabieren. Die zweite Welle der globalen Krise kann vom pazifischen Raum ebenso wie vom europäischen or leaving both. All current success stories are only snapshots that are already projected for years to come - just like at the height of the global deficit economy between 2007 and the summer of 2008. Here, the percentage of success of growth and exports are even more dubious than before, because they start from a much lower initial level after the crash of the global economy. The resilient positive thinking strives to meet his Waterloo next. The question is, which required incubation period, the new opposition this time able to discharge. one can only stainless
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